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There is no universality which is not 
a hegemonic universality.
 — Ernesto Laclau1
One has to admire Contingency, Hegemony, Universality for trying 
to jumpstart the Left out of its current paralysis, which Slavoj Žižek 
 describes as the Left’s unwritten prohibition on political projects  (127) 
and as “the (im)possibilities of radical thought and action today” (91).2 
The book stages a respectful dialogue among Žižek, Judith Butler, and 
Ernesto Laclau to dramatize what the book’s triumvirate of authors calls 
their “anti-totalitarian, radical democratic project.” Any declaration of 
solidarity by theorists of a progressive bent is sure to be welcomed by the 
Left, and the project of a radical democracy certainly warrants the expo-
sition the book means to provide — especially now that recent electoral 
events in the United States make some stodgy democratic institutions 
appear radical indeed.  
 The book is a gamble, though. First, it begs to be measured by the 
theoretical range of its three authors, which is only paralleled by the dif-
ferences in their personalities. Their prefatory notes say the book hopes 
to “establish the common trajectory of our thought,” then add that the 
results reflect “the different intellectual commitments we have.” While 
they reiterate their mutual concord, it is hard to discount the notori-
ously dissimilar styles of the authors, which are perhaps not unrelated 
to deeper degrees of theoretical and political differences. The unruffled 
style of Butler mirrors her inclination to mediate and reconcile incom-
patibles; the careful logic of Laclau convinces us that social change is 
both imminent and immanent; while Žižek’s passionate impatience for 
political action uses earthy examples that cannot help but stir us up. 
The talk of solidarity also runs against the grain of the reader’s curiosity, 
which is more likely to be piqued by the issues that divide them than by 
the rhetoric that unites them. 
 What links the authors together nonetheless deserves our fullest 
 attention. Surprisingly (given how much out of favor he fell in the mid-
twentieth century) Hegel — not Marx — is what most generally ties them 
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to each other, particularly Hegel’s labor of the negative. This return to Hegel constitutes one of 
the book’s larger stories. So does the trio’s common turn from Marxist views to the refinement 
that Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony brought to the analysis of ideology. The latter is 
less surprising than the Hegelian return, since Ernesto Laclau has long drawn on the Italian’s 
anti-fascist thinking for his own work with Chantal Mouffe. Finally, there is the authors’ shared 
focus on what is broadly “postmodern” theory, a general rubric that covers theories that broke 
openly with Marx (e.g., Foucault), inherently apolitical theories that nonetheless found a certain 
reception on the Left (e.g., Saussure, who was enthusiastically embraced by the first generation of 
Russian revolutionaries). Yet what is really at issue here is integrating Lacanian psychoanalysis 
and poststructuralism (which all these authors have previously used to amplify their positions) 
into Leftist discourse. Because the Left politics of psychoanalysis and poststructuralism are not 
obvious, I suspect that the reader will need to keep working away at the book (which requires 
passage through densely self-referential argumentation) to reach an assessment of the contribu-
tion to radical democracy. 
 Altogether, it is not an easy book to respond to simply. I have decided therefore to take the 
title seriously, and to read it with the intention of grasping both the overall effect of the book and 
engaging what each theorist and each theory may be bringing to the question of post-structuralism 
and psychoanalysis for the Left.
HEGEMONY
Let me take up Gramscian hegemony and counter-hegemony first. Gramsci originated the theory 
of hegemony in his fateful encounter with Italian Fascism and its “new” way of achieving political 
dominance. Hegemony for Gramsci was the process whereby the ruling class, to advance its own 
political ends, subtly guided the ruled classes, covertly dominating their most inward percep-tions 
and distorting their intimate, everyday relations. Through hegemonic practices, the ruling classes 
entrenched their position of power. Counter-hegemony is the practice of strategic resist-ance 
on the part of the ruled class to hegemonic power. One might recall the way Stendhal depicted 
Restauration France in The Red and the Black.3 The overt politics of the reactionary nobles in 
the novel usually run aground, but they succeed quite well in reacquiring ruling status and come 
to redominate the formerly revolutionary classes by imposing their own manners and mores on 
them as ideals. Since their former lordly privileges were severely curtailed under the Charter 
(the new constitution), the nobles thus hegemonically attain their ends by these new political 
means. (I apologize for my simplified description of Gramsci’s brilliant amendment to Marxist 
theory, but I feel the need to do so because  Contingency, Hegemony, Universality complicates 
the concept in so many ways.) 
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 Hegemony in Laclau: The most programmatic treatment of hegemony is Ernesto Laclau’s. 
 As he has done elsewhere, Laclau diligently updates Gramsci for postwar, post-Marxist Europe 
— and for postmodern theory. Laclau displaces earlier ideas of who and what the “ruling class” 
is (e.g., the nobles, the bourgeoisie) and what the ruled or potentially counter-hegemonic class is 
(for Gramsci it was the Southern Italian peasants, whereas for Marx it was the urban proletariat). 
More crucial than these context-driven substitutions, Laclau’s view is that class conflict itself 
is no longer the central social antagonism it was for Marx and Gramsci. After all, the state has 
mutated, and in Gramsci hegemonic power over civil society was needed only to secure political 
control over the state, which in turn reinforced ruling class hegemony. Historical circumstances 
(such as the formation of the EU and global capital) have obviously altered the internal and ex-
ternal contours of “the state,” and the function and location of hegemony must correspondingly 
shift, too. 
 For Laclau hegemony nevertheless remains an indispensable theoretical and practical tool for 
democracy. Hegemony indirectly serves structural social change through its differential opera-
tions: it produces a requisite “third dimension” to socio-political existence (56) without which 
there is no “production of tendentially empty signifiers” (57) to undo (however provisionally) 
fundamental social antagonisms. Even though hegemonization has never really eradicated 
a single social antagonism, it permits the social order to embed a permanently open place, 
unconditioned, for counter-hegemonization to occupy. As “the representation of an impossi-
bility,” hegemony keeps open a division between universal and particular: “while maintaining 
the incommensurability between the universal and particulars, [it] enables the latter to take up 
the representation of the former” (56-57). Hegemony surpasses (while being modeled on) class 
 division and its role is to lay the foundations for future social change. 
 Hegemony in Butler: Judith Butler’s adoption of Gramscian hegemony is quite unlike Laclau’s. 
Butler takes issue with the divisions, oppositions, and universals Laclau thinks crucial to the 
concept of hegemony (and crucial to social order itself). Butler repudiates hegemony structured 
as division (class division for Gramsci; universal/particular division for Laclau), and prefers a 
hegemony that forms two faces of a single coin, that is, it operates within the bounded sphere of 
discourse. For Butler, social and class antagonisms are not merely historically dépassés; they are 
quite likely the root of social disorders. It is almost wholly on a pragmatic basis then, that Butler 
values hegemony — for how it can be used to consolidate Left gains and/or contest Left losses. 
 Why does Butler resist division and opposition, which are (for Rousseau, Hegel and certainly 
for Laclau) the engines that drive social history? Adapting Gramsci in a synchronic, Foucauldian 
way, Butler extends hegemony to include anything that holds sway over the person (not just as 
a member of a class). In Butler hegemony assumes the guise of “regulatory apparatuses” (157), 
such as the various agencies of national and international governance, censorship boards, and 
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even at one point, “intellectuals” (148). These regimes of power are not fixated in any one fac-
tion or group but coterminous with social order itself. Butler locates hegemonic power in social 
 ideals (norms), a prioris that impose identifications that are reproduced in the unconscious (13; 
279). These internalized norms are generated by tricks of linguistic opposition, meaning-effects 
 produced wholly by language’s differential operations (153). Yet they function hegemonically to 
shape “citizen-subjects in the domain of representation” (14). 
 Language is for Butler the generative site not only of hegemony but also of counter-hegemony. 
Hegemonic and counter-hegemonic practices are not a matter, à la Laclau, of generating new, 
even contestatory empty signifiers, but of restructuring and subverting old ones. At the end of 
Butler’s second intervention, “On Competing Universalities,” she writes: “The task will be not to 
assimilate the unspeakable into the domain of speakability in order to house it there, within the 
existing norms of dominance, but to shatter the confidence of dominance, to show how equivocal 
its claims to universality are, and… track the break up of its regime” (179). 
 Butler’s program is apolitical viewed from the standpoint of traditional politics: there are no 
warring factions, no struggles between politicized groups; there is only aggression toward regimes 
of power. Her program statement above will undoubtedly sound more than a bit Nietzschean (the 
transvaluation of all values) to Marxists and more than a bit over-general for radicals to whom 
she offers few pointers on where to aim their insurgent energies. (The generality of this quota-
tion put me in mind of a journalistic comment I once read on Butler’s writing in Lingua Franca 
complaining that it has “no neighborhood, no nation, no epoch.” This struck me, of course, as 
not specific to Butler’s style but to the lifestyle-bans capitalism increasingly puts us under.)  
 What is “Left” about hegemony for Butler? Can she be attacked for plunging hegemony’s roots 
so deep into language only in order to skirt the problem of class and the divisions it brings? No, 
it is the other way around. Like Laclau, Butler rejects the notion that hegemony serves particular 
“ruling class” interests, but she does not reject it for the same reasons as Laclau (the world-his-
torical shift in the configuration of the state). Butler’s reasoning inserts class itself into a long 
list of the (unfortunate) effects of the linguistic “power regime” that arbitrarily structures per-
sonal and social identifications. Her partial inventory of the choices imposed on us by language 
includes those that “separate the person from the animal”; “distinguish between two sexes to 
craft identification in the direction of an ‘inevitable’ heterosexuality and ideal morphologies of 
gender”; and produce “tenacious identifications and disavowals in relation to racial, national 
and class identities” (153). 
 It may take the reader a moment to realize that Butler isn’t simply, like Laclau, elasticizing 
hegemony to fit changed sociopolitical circumstances. Butler’s unexcited prose is really quite 
disproportionate to her inflation of the concept and the destruction she is willing to inflict on 
all claims to universality by its means. Hegemony becomes coextensive (coeval, perhaps?) with 
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language, the source of all power — not just ruling class power — to shape and subordinate per-
sonal identities through naming and interpellation. Lest we imagine that language’s pan-social 
force might thus lead her to political quietism (as Nussbaum has suggested4), Butler makes it 
plain that the destructive effects of language and ideal identification are to be met militantly, 
with “disidentificatory resistance” (150-153).5 “The struggle to think hegemony anew is not quite 
possible…without inhabiting precisely that line where the norms of legitimacy…break down” 
(178). Language users must deploy language to resist its destructive effects. In the round world 
of Butler’s discursive power (and the social field enclosed by it), the politics of hegemony involves 
the fact that it inevitably confronts its own counter-hegemonic face.   
 While Butler’s theory is complex, her political vision is extraordinarily simple — this may be 
the basis of her popular appeal. She detaches counter-hegemony from class and frees it to circu-
late and operate at any point in the total social field, though its value is surely highest at a local 
level where “shatter[ing] the confidence of dominance” would be most visible. (I could picture 
it at work in small social circles but couldn’t imagine it for large-scale national or international 
politics.) Still, Butler has more axiomatic concerns in sight. Observe what Butler once wrote 
about gender-identity: “Consider the medical interpellation which…shifts an infant from an 
‘it’ to a ‘she’ or ‘he,’ and in that naming, the girl is ‘girled,’ brought into the domain of language 
and kinship through the interpellation of gender.”6 It is not impossible to extrapolate from her 
disjoining gender (a specific difference) from sex (an opposition) to see how discursive counter-
hegemony might begin at birth. Parents and medical personnel might refuse to label a newborn 
a “he” or a “she,” and instead label it an “it.” 
 Counter-hegemony works for Butler primarily at this highly personal level; it appears to affect 
deeper political levels only by implication. Of course, Butler warns against thinking in “levels,”7 
and thus she meets one of the originating impulses of the New Left: to make the personal the 
political. Left political action no longer consists of finding out just exactly how some specific “they” 
is ruling you (as member of a socioeconomic class) and then acting against “them” in concert 
with others to foil their control. For Butler, Left political action is now a matter of realizing how 
“regimes of power” (151) compel us internally “to consent to what constrains us” (29), a mat-
ter of throwing off that compulsion, presumably by what the 60’s called “getting your head on 
straight.” In resisting social interpellations and imposed identifications, we spontaneously make 
a political statement — and from what I see in Butler’s essays here, it appears to be perhaps the 
only political pronouncement we can still make.8  
 Hegemony in Žižek: For Žižek, something else enters the picture of hegemony. Unlike Laclau 
and Butler, Žižek’s Old Left concerns have not entirely faded away under postmodern conditions. 
The social field to which he rearticulates Gramscian hegemony has little in common with the 
monologic one of Butler, and only slightly more so with Laclau’s social structuring-in-process. 
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Žižek agrees with Laclau that hegemony adds a crucial “third dimension” to social and political 
life indispensable to their analysis. Nevertheless, Žižek’s hegemony mirrors his psychoanalytic 
commitment to “levels,” that is, to the fact of irreconcilable conflicts. In Žižek’s Lacanian eyes, 
hegemony represents radical social antagonism “through the particular differences internal to 
the system” of a social field — class, race, and so on. But it also additionally reveals a contingent, 
indirect presence that hovers eerily over all these representations. Any delineation of an “intra-
social difference [within a social space],” Žižek writes, is connected umbilically to another more 
radical difference: “the limit that separates society from non-society” (92). 
 What makes Žižek insist on this limit, this radical opposition between society and what-it-is-
not? While it may have something to do with Hegel’s dialectic of self and not-self, I suspect it 
has much more (if not everything) to do with the “psychic life of power” (to borrow Butler’s title, 
but not its spirit). Put simply, Žižek rejects the poststructural position that is content to settle 
with the understanding that language is the origin of society (which no one can doubt), and that 
dismisses (like Derrida in Of Grammatology) the search for pre-linguistic origins as theological. 
Žižek poses a still more radical question: that of the origin and the cause of the drives. Though 
drives are a-social, they arise not from nature but from the very differential, linguistic structur-
ing of the social — from its symbolic designations, labeling, classifications, and so on. Žižek’s 
“limit” is quite a different one from the sensible limits deconstruction draws around language so 
as to be able to enjoy a definitive plunge into the linguistic medium. Žižek is not bracketing the 
(non-linguistic) symbolic, but confronting it. He thus opens up a political horizon quite unlike 
Butler’s and Laclau’s discursive domain. Instead, Žižek looks to what happens when language 
(the symbolic) fails to maintain hegemony over itself — that is, when the symbolic, society, and 
language are threatened from within.
 The limit Žižek inscribes between society and non-society is not just a variable border, but a 
determinate one that marks where the symbolic-social begins and where it ends. Žižek’s limit is 
an internal limit — the disturbing point where the social self stops and the drives begin, where 
language confronts what it can never say. This point is what Lacan called the real. The specific 
political interest of this Lacanian point for Žižek is that the internal limit appears simultaneously 
in the social situation and in the individual. The “internal limit” is not merely a question of where 
you stop and the other guy begins, but where you stop being you, where your self (shaped by the 
signifier) ends and your drives begin.9 When this internal limit is reached, it is felt as external 
compulsion, emanating from “the Other.” 
 Here, we are as far from the bounded social space of Butler as from the open-ended one 
of Laclau. For Žižek, radical antagonism (between the social and the not-social) can only be 
 represented in a distorted way through the particular differences internal to the social system 
— in the space between the symbols, but also the space between individuals. This return of the 
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real gets “mapped” onto intrasocial differences (“between elements in a social space”) “in the 
guise of a difference” (92). The real is thus an effect of the fundamental opposition language/not 
 language (or social/not social or symbolic/real). But its fierce encounter with the not-symbolic 
adds dimensionality to the flat, imaginary representation of social classifications as mere differ-
ences. It inserts a permanent non-place into symbolic-social-linguistic articulations. It is where 
imaginary and symbolic distinctions come to a halt. 
 Žižek defines the real as hegemonic because it has the power to insert a distortion into the social 
relations shaped by symbolic articulations similar to the one Gramsci’s ruling class exercised. 
Gramsci’s political hegemony was external to civil society; Žižek’s real radicalizes the distinction 
by having it exceed the merely social: a real limit is permanently sutured to the absolute nonreal-
ity (the fictionality) of the social (which has only a symbolic-contractual and linguistic existence 
and never anything more than that). Mapped onto social differences, this exorbitant real must be 
dealt with. Žižek has analyzed its effects in the phenomena of racism, fascism, communism, and 
perversion, employing both political and psychoanalytic methods.10 Language is not a solution 
to it, but is a part of the problem. 
 It might still sound as if Žižek were pretty far removed from Old Left topics (like class conflict) 
here. Yet he is the one who insists that class has never actually been exorcised from political con-
figurations: for him it is the specific antagonism that overdetermines the rest even today (321). 
Indeed, Žižek insists that we must carry on the analysis of global capitalism by determining how 
classes are now reconfiguring themselves under capitalism’s pressures (322-23) — into symbolic, 
imaginary, and real fractions. How can we reconcile these directions in Žižek? I would guess that 
the link between Žižek’s hegemonic real and his refusal to disavow class antagonism may have 
more to do with his embrace of the originating impulse of  democracy than with some nostalgia 
for an aging Marxist theory that might ultimately be incompatible with psychoanalysis.
 Brief Excursus on Class: Before I attempt to reconcile this seeming contradiction in Žižek, 
however, I am going to make another simplified statement of the issues, this time regarding 
“class.” We cannot afford to forget that the feudal world was organized not by classes, but as a 
series of corporate social bodies (one’s “estate” was one’s social “being”). These were thought of 
as homogeneous, unified, separated, and self-enclosed. The corporatist way of organizing soci-
ety came to an end (temporarily? I sometimes wonder) with the democratic revolutions of the 
eighteenth century. These revolutions inaugurated a sense of society as “whole body,” organized 
now only by its differentiations, which included the most crucial “difference” of  all — division 
into classes. Corporatism had operated quite effectively by providing its members with a sense 
of their natural place and their natural birthright (although this was about the only right secured 
for the individual): one’s estate, one’s status was all. (There is always some lingering nostalgia 
for the general harmony that corporatist social organization seemed to offer.)
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 The revolutionary overthrow of the establishment (estates) in favor of membership by class 
now meant that one was identified with a group whose interests were necessarily in conflict with 
those of other such groups. The disharmony introduced by these divisions was further sustained 
by the sense that each member and each group also possessed certain inalienable rights. Only 
the conception of universal rights sustained the differentiated social body, preventing it from 
fracturing into warring components. To Marx, the necessary tension between class and universal 
found its first radical expression in the French Revolution. Marx also believed that Hegel modeled 
his abstract dialectic of universal and particular on that revolution. 
 Žižek, Again: Gramsci inspires us to move beyond taking Marx’s class warfare too literally. 
Yet for Žižek, Gramscian hegemony can be exploited only if class divisions are still operative, 
even though now transposed from the nation to the transnational. Žižek openly chides his fel-
low authors for failing to contest the hegemonic practices of global capitalism and for failing to 
 recognize it as the new ruling class that has issued the command to end all class antagonism. Žižek 
thus calls for a repoliticized analysis of the global economy (223; 321) by using a concept of hege-
mony supplemented with the resources of psychoanalysis (the power of the real). The corporate 
homogenization that distorts and (imaginarily) flattens social life today requires the reminder of 
the real to disclose its actual dimensions and to ascertain capitalism’s internal limit. 
 Žižek seems unconcerned that we might revert to a politics of being (although he talks about 
how class differences are ontologized today). But he is concerned that the dissolution of class op-
positions into postmodernism’s proliferating particularities disavows the relation to the universal 
in a way that may unthinkingly subvert one of democracy’s crucial supports. “Each particularity 
involves its own universality” (316), Žižek declares, despite his awareness that class conflict (and 
by extension, universality) are no longer fashionable terms of analysis. Yet his witty first chap-
ter, “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, Please!,” refuses to equate democracy either with a 
society of economic class divisions, à la Marx, or with contemporary “post-scarcity society,” in 
which class division is deemed irrelevant to its “multiple political subjectivities” (99). 
 Thus we find the following incompatibilities with respect to hegemony (and its corollary, class), 
which the book does not editorially clarify. The interlocutors keep us wondering just what the 
common project of radical democracy might actually mean. We’ve heard from Žižek, for example, 
that class antagonism covertly remains fully implicated in the advance of global capitalism today 
(320) and that the global economy must be repoliticized. We’ve heard from Laclau that traditional 
class antagonisms have been overtaken by the events of history, and that the task of the Left is 
to lay out the constitution for a social order open to change, ready to recognize and deal flexibly 
with perduring social antagonisms (299). From Butler, we have encountered yet a third option 
(the one that has gained wide currency on the American academic Left). We are to undertake, 
pragmatically, issue-by-issue reviews of zones of oppression to exercise our practical reason. 
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For example, Butler defines “Left action” as maintaining “a political culture of contestation 
on…issues, such as the legitimacy and legality of public zones of sexual exchange, intergenera-
tional sex, adoption outside marriage, increased research and testing for AIDS, and transgender 
 politics” (161; this is no “quietist”). Butler’s skeptical treatment of the content of earlier analyses 
of regimes of power (Marx, Gramsci) stems from her sense of the power of language to injure 
and cure. She encourages us to focus on those places where power is arbitrarily exercised and to 
denounce it — as she herself does when she castigates “intellectuals” (unspecified) who “argue 
against non-normative sexual practices” (148) and collaborate, in effect, with state repression of 
gays. Note that the “issues” which draw Butler’s active involvement have little or nothing to do 
with social antagonism and everything to do with false negations and unconscious disavowals 
at the  personal level. 
 The authors’ differences only magnify as the book progresses. Žižek begins by saying, “my 
dialogue with [his two fellow authors] relies on shared propositions” (91) and, even after their 
exhaustive debates, he maintains that he “fully supports Butler’s political aims” (313). But his 
intensely politicized finish emphasizes dramatically the specific disagreements he has with 
 Butler (and with Laclau to a milder degree) over their failure to see the persistence of Left is-
sues not because of but despite their theories: to him, they avoidably underrate and seriously 
under-represent politics through their inattention to the contradictions of (or the internal limit 
in) socio-symbolic life. “I continue to think, in the old Marxist vein,” Žižek writes, “that today’s 
capitalism, in its very triumph, is breeding new ‘contradictions’ which are potentially even more 
explosive than those of standard industrial capitalism. A series of irrationalities immediately 
comes to mind…” (322). 
 For Žižek modern Lacanian psychoanalysis re-animates our sense of contradiction crucial 
to democracy and to the political critique of capitalism: “The capitalist system is…approaching 
its inherent limit and self-cancellation…. ‘Frictionless capitalism’ (Bill Gates) is turning into a 
 nightmare in which the fate of millions is decided in hyper-reflexive speculation on futures…” 
(322-5). If we compare this statement with Butler’s “the field of differential relations from which 
any and all particular identities emerge must be limitless” (31), we can then see a very real differ-
ence. In Žižek, as in Butler, there is a “personal” level, but his is inseparable from the social and the 
political, caught as it is in a series of contradictions: it is a subject. Butler merges personal, social, 
and political into a single-level self (the term she uses increasingly as the book develops).  
 As the book thus makes and unmakes its strange bedfellows, issue by issue, position by posi-
tion, it only obliquely informs its readers about the potential political programs, actions, and 
outcomes of the Left theories exposited. We are left wondering where the Left is heading. Still, I 
want to continue to highlight the conceptual and practical distinctions in the book — not to show 
the Left as troubled but to draw some instruction from what troubles it.
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UNIVERSALITY
I’ve already touched on the final term of the book’s title, universality, and mentioned historicist 
skepticism regarding universal claims and universal human rights. Each author acknowledges 
the contemporary critique of the universal (as a ruse for imposing imperialist dictates, and so 
on). Nevertheless, for Laclau and Žižek the universal remains the sine qua non of liberatory 
politics. 
 Laclau and the Universal: Laclau recognizes Hegel’s deconstruction of the universal by “a 
radical exclusion” (207); but for Laclau the “universal’s dependency on particularity” is part and 
parcel of the “universalist emancipatory project” (207). For Laclau, the universal is a necessary 
moment of the social dialectic. Although its power has been battered by history and shattered 
by theory’s devastating critiques, universality remains, for him, the authentic site of counter-
 hegemony: universality resides literally nowhere, neither in civil nor in political society. The Left’s 
task is not to mount futile counter-hegemonic strategies but to use hegemony’s universalizing 
resources against itself to recognize and attenuate the antagonisms endemic in society. In Laclau, 
hegemony paves the way for constructing  universality (280 ff.) by creating the space/non-space 
of “tendentially empty signifiers.” 
 Butler and the Universal: For Butler the dependence of the universal on the particular (which 
secretes the former) not only vitiates the political and liberatory claims of the universal, but the 
exclusions essential to it stain, contaminate, and haunt it. Butler finds it more rational to go along 
with fellow critics Zerilli and Scott who have sought the universal “only in the chain of signifiers” 
or in the “undecidable coincidence” between universal and particular (33). 
 For Butler, the reach of language is sufficient to dispense with the universal. She is frankly 
suspicious of the universal as the place where sterile social oppositions and fatal political antag-
onisms secretly meet and marry.11 For her, hegemony has no inherent universalizing power and 
no need of it. Hegemony’s sole usefulness lies in the extent to which it strengthens the Left’s 
current sway over our hearts and minds, and turns its power of regulation to emancipatory 
ends. (I suppose this is akin to political correctness.) And hegemony for Butler is nothing other 
than linguistic power. Compared with the relative absolutism of language, politics and the Law 
are mere partial hegemonies with far less reach. Language alone ensures the power of doing 
and undoing: in politics, Butler tells us, “language is unsurpassable” (279). Most importantly, 
language is precisely not a universal. 
 Butler’s is technically a culturalist viewpoint; and while the phenomenon of language is 
 indeed anthropologically universal, it is always pragmatically used to distinguish one culture 
from another. To mediate between these two, Butler turns not to the universal but to cultural 
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and linguistic translation (36-37). Butler replaces the universal, once essential to the definition 
of democracy, with language, and it is thus extremely important for her to link language to her 
radical democratic project. At first this seems simple: she characterizes democracy now as a 
contestation over signifiers. But hers do not work the way Laclau’s signifiers do, to generate the 
liberating, sweepingly empty force of the “Next” signifier. Butler urges instead a stoppage of 
the signifier-machinery: “Sometimes you have to let certain signifiers stand, assume a certain 
givenness at a certain moment of analysis when they become forbidden territory” (269). Energy 
thus retrieved from freezing the differential thrust of language is of the same kind that Beltway 
Hegelians, such as Francis Fukuyama, drew off from the dialectical march of history (by ending 
the Cold War). Like dialectical materialist oppositions, linguistic oppositions need not drive social 
history any longer, and Butler turns then instead toward their own undoing. 
 What “works” for Butler therefore is neither a progressive nor a regressive dialectic; it is a 
synchronic breaching of the identities formed by dialectical oppositions that opens them to 
 “innovative misuse” by and for “those who are not authorized in advance to make use of them” 
(36). The merging of the linguistic with the social and the political (all subject to the counter-
hegemony of tropology) renders the universal nugatory for Butler.
 Žižek and the Universal: Žižek’s viewpoint shares parts of both: the universal is both eman-
cipatory, à la Laclau, and contaminated by the particular, à la Butler. However, it is precisely 
because it is contaminated that the universal is emancipatory. He writes, “Capital sets a limit 
to resignification” (223), asserting its hegemonic power to alter or even freeze social relations 
and displace the work of the universal. Žižek counters capital with the proposal that “the inclu-
sions/exclusions in the hegemonic notion of human rights…can be renegotiated and redefined 
and the reference to universality can serve precisely as a tool that stimulates such questioning 
and renegotiation” (102).
  Brief Excursus on the Universal: At this point, I would like to pause my review once more to 
recall something about the universal that seems to be falling outside the book’s explicit radar. 
The fact that there remains such an unbridgeable difference between Butler and her co-authors 
with respect to the universal really must concern us. Especially given that those on the Left 
who have stuck by the dialectical method of Hegel (even critically, like Marx or Sartre) and who 
have disclaimed (as Butler does not) Hegel’s aim of total knowledge, have never abandoned the 
 universal.  
 After all, not long ago, if someone raised the matter of universalism and particularism in Left 
politics, the concepts would have seemed perfectly easy to express and particularly helpful to 
social democratic causes. Consider how Marx’s Hegelian eyes were once trained on a minor 
weavers’ revolt in Germany. Marx found this seemingly insignificant revolt to be of universal 
importance — not an exemplar of economic class warfare but as an exemplar of “social revolu-
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tion.” Marx said, “[E]ven though it be limited to a single industrial district, [it] affects the totality, 
because it is a human protest against a dehumanized life, because it starts from the standpoint 
of the single, real individual, because the collectivity against whose separation from himself the 
individual reacts is the true collectivity of man, the human essence.”12
 Social revolution, for Marx, always has a necessarily universal character. It reminds us that 
what lies beyond the compass of the social is the inhuman. “The political soul of revolution” has 
something of this inhuman character: it consists of “a tendency of the classes without political 
influence to end their isolation from the top positions in the state. Their standpoint is that of the 
state, an abstract whole, that only exists through a separation from real life…. Thus a revolution 
with a political soul also organizes, in conformity with its limited and double nature, a ruling 
group in society to society’s detriment.”13 Marx’s universal goes beyond class in order to reach 
the point where the social has encountered the non-social, the “dehumanizing.” To overcome, 
even in one small particular instance, the dehumanizing effect of the class antagonisms in  politi-
cized society (class antagonisms are just social relations distorted by ruling class interests) is 
to access the universal by way of the particular. This universal is what reminds us that civil society 
— that is, the existence of the collective that defines us and thus makes us human14 — must protest 
each and every effort to separate individuals and classes of individuals from life in common. 
 Simply put, we could say that the “particularity” of the weavers’ revolt creates universality out 
of the very excess of its particularization, a particularization pushed to the point that it forces 
(social) non-being upon the weavers. So far this does not sound much different from Butler’s 
desire to include the “excluded.” But her resistance to the universal leaves an essential element 
unaccounted for.
 When Marx speaks of a class so fully devastated, so excluded, so dehumanized, and so dis-
possessed that it is not merely relegated to haunting the society that denies it all standing, but 
is forced into becoming the universal, I doubt it would be very hard for anyone, philosopher or 
not,  to miss his point. The weavers’ sense of fundamental banishment from the ranks of the 
 human results not in their spectral return or their enjoyment of a revenge of the repressed, but 
the reverse. It is only in realizing their exclusion from the human that the universal is born, and 
that the “human” can be reconstructed.
 What the weavers’ revolt “says” to Marx (and this is its “universal” character) is that no one 
should suffer as we are suffering. This no one is a critical, negative universal. It conceals no petty 
self-interests. It has no particular content, even though its coming into existence depends entirely 
on the particular that has been squeezed down to become no more than a universal shout: “No 
one should have to suffer this way.” For Marx (as for others) it is this universal — which recog-
nizes an internal obstacle to the sway of political discriminations, that recognizes the point where 
the social and the not-social meet — that drives all change in society, in the very society from 
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which it has been separated and alienated. Awareness of one’s deprivation of a place in human 
society is the sine qua non of a universality that simply can never exist within society. I think 
this is very much the same as Žižek’s insistence on determining a point where the social and the 
not-social collide.
 I cannot imagine that Butler would really want to preclude in advance this power to move a 
self-satisfied social world off its dead center, this no one should have to….
 And was the universal not also the contribution to democracy that Rosa Parks made? When 
Parks stood firm and refused to move to the back of the bus, was she merely saying, “Don’t treat me 
like this because my identity as a person of color and as a woman is merely discursively imposed 
by racist society and thus you have no right to treat me like this just because I look to you as if I 
naturally belong to one or several of these categories when I know that I am free not to do so”? 
 No. 
 Rosa Parks, by her eloquent gesture, was saying that no one might henceforward arbitrarily 
be deprived of the right to be treated as a human being by other human beings. She was also 
saying, more concretely, that not all people are being treated as I am here. We might quibble, 
and say that “‘human’ is only a culturally relative distinction.” But what we cannot do is use this 
cultural relativist stance to deflate the power of the universal or to ignore that the “humanity” 
to which Parks’ gesture is referable means a “humanity” created wholly out of language and its 
social contract. Not just any local social contract which can easily dismiss or define her out of 
existence, but the symbolic pact — Peirce’s, Rousseau’s, and so on.
 Marx’s is a “contestatory universal” that treats individuals frozen out of social identifications 
not as individualized victims, but as members of a new ex-class, one whose only existence resides 
uniquely in its articulation as the universal exclamation that no one should be forced to and not 
all are being forced to…. Such a universal offers what nothing “in” society can: a standpoint 
with which to seize society as a “whole.” A particularity cast apart from “the whole” that is bent 
on eliminating its particularity, miraculously grows to the size of the universe, and grasps “the 
whole” as a finite totality. In Marx, the universal is the antagonist of what Sartre calls “self-en-
closed” (totalitarian) society.15 When some particularity stands thus apart from the whole, and 
is alienated from it, its universality comes into being. In the case of Marx — and Parks —  this 
apartness provides the drive for social revolution — or even simply for social change. 
 Classical democracy attempted to secure a permanent place for such a universal vantage point. 
Žižek likens its “holding the place” to the demos (the part of no part) that Jacques Rancière has 
written of, the people that exists nowhere: “I am tempted to claim that this shadowy existence 
is the very site of political universality: in politics, universality is asserted when such an agent 
with no proper place, ‘out of joint,’ posits itself as the direct embodiment of universality against 
all those who do have a place within [the] global order” (313). This universal exceeds or falls 
U
M
BR(a)    41
short of every division of society into classes and every cataloguing of its members’ roles. Its is 
the only voice that can enunciate, see, criticize, and yet still speak for “the whole.” The demos is 
the internal limit of the whole and as the universal it casts its shadow over each and every social 
distinction. We can see this each and every mode (the flip side of not-all) in Sartre’s description 
below. Who, before postmodern principles of uncertainty, would have failed to see the universal 
as nothing but its impact on smug little social circles? Sartre writes:  
If it is impossible to find in every man some universal essence which would be human nature, yet there 
does exist a universal human condition.… Historical situations vary; a man may be born a slave in a 
pagan society or a feudal lord or a proletarian. What does not vary is the necessity for him to exist in 
the world, to be at work there, to be there in the midst of other people, and to be moral there.… Con-
sequently, every configuration, however individual it may be, has a universal value.16
 Butler and the Universal, Once More: Butler quibbles with the universal in the name of the 
global on the same grounds Sartre quibbles with the “great maxims” of Kantian ethics: “The 
content [of the universal maxim] is always concrete and thereby unforeseeable; there is always 
the element of invention.” But Sartre does not quibble with making freedom into the universal: 
“The one that counts is knowing whether the inventing that has been done, has been done in the 
name of freedom.” Its social realization is obviated in advance, yet its lack of (symbolic, social, 
 linguistic) articulation is precisely its only source of power. 
 Butler is prepared to universalize democracy in a completely new way, by incorporating the 
negative force of the universal into discursive reason. Democracy is secured, she tells us, through 
its resistance to actualization: it “defers realization permanently…it is essential to this practice 
to remain, in some permanent way unrealizable” (268). And she rejects any opposition (such as 
Marx’s distinction between the ideality of philosophy and the actuality of the world) that prevents 
conflating ideality and actuality instead of “maintaining a certain distance between the ideality 
of the ideal and the givenness of any modes of its instantiation” (269). This conflation makes the 
norm (the ideal) and deviations from it the length and breadth of any social or personal bone of 
contention. 
 Butler’s democracy can remain unrealized only because language is its life-blood. Language 
deals the original blow of idealization and then checks idealization with linguistic deviations 
(tropes, swerves). It unseats power and can make anyone powerful. As no one can use language 
without being interpreted, so no one can interpret without speaking otherwise than one intends 
(279).17 Nothing exterior to the social whole delimited by language needs to exist for this ongoing, 
democratic redistribution of power to operate in perpetuity. 
 Is there a politics in Butler, then, in anything like its classic (Marx, Hegel, Rousseau, Gramsci) 
sense of a force that distorts human social relations? If there is, Butler locates it entirely in 
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 discourse. She makes hegemony and the universal yield premiere place to language’s differential 
structure — a structure that only language has the means to attack (with the ruses of rhetoric, 
irony, parody, or with the “repeatable figure,” the “citation,” the “circulating trope” [269]). Her 
final paragraph concludes: “Language will not only build the truth that it conveys, but will also 
convey a different truth from the one that was intended, and this will be a truth about language, its 
unsurpassability in politics” (279).  
 Given a delimited, manageable social setting (the metaphor of Aristotle’s stage comes to mind), 
Butler’s stance can work quite well. We can dispense with extra-linguistic universality if democracy 
is universalized. Discriminations and contradictions can be sublated as contestations over mere 
signifiers if democracy is hegemonic. To adapt the performative for picturing Butler’s politics: we 
have a stage; some will get to go right on; others must wait in the wings (or on the margins, as Butler 
puts it). But the latter will one day be free to move to center stage. The emancipatory mechan-isms 
of this move are rhetorical and performative tropic deviations from the norm that (democrat-ically) 
will eventually grant anyone the power to alter his/her social standing. 
 There is no need here for a universal standpoint to leverage a democratic totality already thus 
 composed of a dynamic freeplay in which anyone can change roles and anyone can eventually 
 become a “star.” Or is there? Butler is a cultural democrat who works to widen democracy’s range. 
Still, I wonder if Butler’s radical democracy is anything more than cultural? Might we not ask if this 
performative democracy, with its staged identifications, and re-staged universals (and quite a bit 
of stage business) isn’t open to potential redefinition by anti-democratic abuses of language and 
tropology? When she says that “My understanding of hegemony is that its normative and optimistic 
moment consists precisely in the possibilities for expanding the possibilities for the key terms of 
liberalism, rendering them more inclusive, more dynamic and more concrete” (13), she seems 
 reluctant to imagine anything but a single expanding democratic culture, one never under threat 
of radical dissolution or attack by some altogether alien life form. But if democracy is hegemonic, 
why is the Left so hesitant to promote imaginative new programs within it (which it so obviously is), 
since  there is nothing fundamental to fear from the opposition? One wonders, that is, why Butler’s 
democratic stage is never deeply threatened by another stage — eine andere Schauplatz — that might 
be absolutely incongruent with it. It might be time then to ask how evolved Butler’s sense of the 
social really is, in light of her disinclination to recognize antagonisms and their resultant political 
oppositions. In her democracy you are free to change your person/persona by realizing that the 
masks society has imposed on you are arbitrary and subject to change. Yet the choice of alternative 
masks (personae, masks, metaphors) seems culture-bound, limited to a very particular, very civil, 
 already pretty much democratic social sphere. (Žižek’s frustrated critique of the diminished political 
setting of Butler’s work is that those who wait in the wings, “excluded by the hegemonic symbolic 
regime,” might easily be neo-Nazis rather than the disenfranchised, the disregarded … [313]. I’m 
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sure Butler considers this unthinkable.)
LESSONS
Whatever the limitations we might see in her social and political theory, in this book (and possibly 
because of those limitations) Butler seems like a winner. She is classic and engagingly serene, 
making the other two look, by turns, romantic, brooding, modernist, dissonant, argumentative, 
and above all frustrated by her decorum. Butler triumphs here the way the fluid heroes of French 
classical theatre triumph: by smoothly eluding definitive judgments. She parries Žižek and Laclau; 
she juggles multiple theoretical allegiances that refuse to add up to a singular perspective that 
would over-identify her with one or another theoretical stance.18 In this, she is not just being coy 
and hard to pin down, for her deepest political and theoretical allegiance is to the subversion of 
identifiable positions through the masking and ambiguity that tropic language provides. 
 Her diffident style might seem ill-fitted to the dazzle of drag and the destabilized gender 
 identities she promotes as models of subversion. But we need only remind ourselves that the 
 neo-classical stage restricted the numbers of actors and limited the scope of its time, place, and 
action and that these severe stage-limits responded to a desire for circumscription in a society 
on the verge of revolutionary change. (One of the prime indicators of the coming change was 
that, off-stage, people had come to regard their social roles with distance and often horror. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau described it this way: “Although everyone preaches with zeal the maxims of his 
profession, each prides himself on having the tone of another. The magistrate takes on a Cavalier 
air, the financier acts like a Lord, the Bishop makes gallant proposals; the Courtier speaks of 
philosophy; the Statesman of wit and letters; down to the simple artisan, who, unable to assume 
a different tone, dresses in black Sundays in order to look like a man of the palace.”19)
 Butler’s own performance — in this book — is an almost perfect illustration of her strategy for 
“securing democracy.” Butler is unflappably poised. She avoids argumentation over specifics 
and serenely declines to engage in antagonistic debate. What she does do is to characterize the 
others’ work in ways that irritate them quite a bit. In rebuttal, Laclau and Žižek each quote her 
more and more extensively as the book progresses — and the reverse is not the case. This casts 
the others in an almost hysterical light, as argumentative, defensive, quibbling over a word here 
or there (although in the closing chapters each regains his own footing). While this may not 
seem much of an achievement in the case of the exuberant Žižek, it is a monumental one in the 
case of the polished, logical Laclau. Butler becomes thus the de facto center of calm in this book. 
Hers is a tactical ascendancy not particularly supported by details of precise argumentation, but 
it is a stunningly successful performative effect. (Perhaps because American theory assimilated 
the postmodern attitude more rapidly than Europe did, its central discursive mannerism — the 
dismissal of oppositions as fruitless and irrational — comes much more naturally to Butler than 
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to them. Perhaps.) 
 Yet it is not the tactics she deploys so much as her overall hegemonic strategy that the Left must 
take to heart. For the concrete verbal demeanor of Judith Butler here is not a side issue; it car-
ries the significance and the force of her position (non-position). Butler has mastered the entire 
spectrum of postmodern discourses that her Left European interlocutors have only selectively 
and often painstakingly integrated into their pieces, as in Laclau’s “Structure, History, and the 
Political.” Or else they have openly argued against them for theoretical or political reasons. Žižek 
is just as comprehensive as Butler — it’s a Hegelian thing — but Butler’s way of integrating her 
knowledge20 rhetorically and performatively is distinctive, a postmodern procedure par excellence 
that encompasses structure, history, and the political at once. The number of theoreti-cal positions 
Butler is able to absorb, the fluidity with which she adopts and adapts positions from theorists 
quite opposed to each other, amounts to a virtuoso performance: Kant’s a priori and conditions 
of possibilities here; Hegel’s criticisms of Kant there; Foucault’s entrenched opposi-tion to Freud 
over sexuality on one side, and Freud’s insights on figurative language on the other (151). Each 
citation is entirely apropos, yet overall the effect is one of her mastery — her total knowledge. 
 Her aim is, of course, not to display her virtuosity, nor is it even simply to “win.” What Butler 
becomes by using these procedures is the very figure of mediation itself, and this is my point. 
Though it was trivialized by McLuhan (“The Medium is the Message”) and crowned by twentieth- 
century philosophy’s focus on its own means of expression, it is mediation that has wielded the 
most impressive conceptual and political authority in our times. (Think of Reagan’s “Tear down 
the Wall, Mr. Gorbachev”21: to American popular consciousness, the utterance represented the 
performative power that speech act theory sees in its infamous “Let the Games Begin.”) It is the 
performative power of language used for and against itself (to which Butler resorts) that the Left 
must make some decisions about.22 Watching Butler gives us strategic clues on how to operate in 
a newly monologic political world, and we need to heed them very, very carefully. 
 For, Butler’s political Leftism consists in committing herself to harnessing the resources of 
language (rhetoric, irony, masking, ambiguity) for the purpose of eradicating the very movement 
of dialectical opposition itself. If once this strategy met popular demands for the end of the 
Cold War’s “discrete blocs which vie with one another for control of policy questions” (Butler 
13-14), and if it still offers a ready-to-hand recourse for destabilizing political and other forms 
of oppositions, we should now question whether it remains politically effective for the cause of 
democracy. After the fall of communism, after the political map of the world has been redrawn 
one-dimensionally, is this still the best way to go? Indeed, destabilizing oppositions — the post-
modern procedure par excellence — in a one-sided political world is already starting to feel like 
it blocks any way out, prevents universal protest. (I think that’s why so many felt relief at the 
Seattle demonstrations.) 
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 Yet it’s a tough sell to act politically if one is successful at performing rhetorically. Žižek’s 
strategy has been to “up the ante” on the performative and to carry his person as if it were that 
explosive universalizing voice that shakes things up.
 When Laclau says, “there is no future for the Left if it is unable to create an expansive universal 
discourse, constructed out of, not against, the proliferation of particularisms of the last few 
 decades…. The task ahead is to sow the seed of universality, so that we can have a full social 
imaginary” (306), his statement carries a silent rebuke to the restrained imaginary of Butler’s 
discourse (and the perhaps over-full Žižekian one).23  For Butler consistently moves to freeze the 
dialectic just after an opposition has been stated, and just before it inevitably yields or mutates 
into synthesis, she stages it, then neutralizes its effects. Something vaguely unsatisfying and 
generic emerges from her discourse, while Žižek’s, alternatively, can get so caught in engaging 
stories, anecdotes, and so on, that we can’t always find our way back to the logic of his political 
discourse.  
 But there is one more lesson here. In this book, I felt Butler’s heavy accent on mediation was 
one of the things that impelled Žižek (a fellow Hegelian who also subscribes to the logic of figur-
ality, after all) to oppose her tone of reconciliation and to call instead for the Event — an Event 
of the magnitude of the coming of Christ — to enter the world stage. It’s impossible to decouple 
his highly provocative statements (about forgetting the Holocaust and fears of the Gulags and of 
Linksfascismus so we can act and not merely perform politics once more) from his reaction to 
Butler’s discourse. At first he called to my mind a teenager who wants to break with his conform-
ist parents by means of such “shocking” statements. But then it struck me that perhaps the very 
strategies of containment deployed by Butler (structurally similar to those of Third-Way politi-
cians today, or the “radical centre” that Laclau denounces) was what was driving Žižek up the 
wall. If the balanced, down-to-earth Laclau might prefer to split the difference, the discordance 
between Butler’s and Žižek’s approaches also drives Laclau to make strong position statements 
opposed to the others, as when he rejects Žižek’s resuscitation of class, or turns schoolmasterish 
with Butler.  
 I then wondered how any of them would respond to the highly provocative and yet imaginatively 
democratic gesture of Bill Clinton’s choosing Harlem for his ex-presidential offices…. Not shock-
ing, not pointing out its excentricity, yet by no means a gesture of mediation.
THE REAL RETURNS?
In the moments where, despite efforts to remain above the fray, commoner forms of antagonism 
break out, the book shows spirit. For all its potential pitfalls, the book reveals how all three theo-
rists must/will have tried to confront the important hegemonic success of what Gramsci called 
the “passive revolutions” of our time (Italian fascism for him; the Reagan Revolution for us) 
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and the disappointing forms of institutionalized Marxist and democratic theory in Communist 
governments and Western nations. All three must/will have taken account of the unexpected 
quarters in which resistance to and for democracy has surfaced: in sexual revolutions, proletarian 
co-optation, Second- and Third-World conflicts and practices — and psychoanalysis. All three 
must/will have tried to confront the major theoretical revolutions of our time — the linguistic 
turn in philosophy and social science and the challenge that psychoanalysis poses to all the major 
traditions of political and social thought. 
 The deepest impulse in this book, and what constitutes its significance, then, is precisely what 
would otherwise be questionable for the Left: its strong stress on theory and on language. Why 
make theory the special focus of a Left book? The answer is that events of a theoretical charac-
ter have posed as many challenges to the post-New Left as the unprecedented historical events 
of the twentieth century posed to the Old Left (the 60s, the end of the Cold War, the decline of 
Marxism and Communism’s exit from Eastern Europe, along with the recent stunning rise of 
conservatism in leading democratic nations). Theoretical perplexities have taken precedence in 
Left debate over the Holocaust, fascism, dictatorships, depressions — the things the older Left 
easily recognized and oftentimes confronted. 
 The implication of the book is, then, that the Left must settle with theory before it will be 
able to confront large-scale social, economic, and political changes now taking place, including 
the epidemic erosion of democratic principles of governance in the West. The theories whose 
fine points the authors carefully rehearse interject themselves into established Left theorizing 
 without fully integrating Left theory per se, nor negotiating its relation to Left praxis — yet. The 
real question of the book is whether contemporary theory and methods secure advantages to the 
Left’s commitment to democracy, and if so, how. Or, to the contrary, is there something about 
the discourse of theory that is blocking the Left’s ability to respond to these events? 
 Thus, when the authors broaden their declaration of purpose to claim they have intended 
the book to confront what they call “the problem of language,” I have to admit I felt like putting 
the book on pause — given my own long history of working in deconstruction, psychoanalysis, 
and political theory. It is the hyperinflated status of language and language-like entities that the 
hard-nosed materialist Old Left has found most difficult to accept in these times, these authors, 
and these theories. 
 Modern democracy and progressive social movements often began as manifestoes, declara-
tions (of Independence or the Rights of Man), constitutions, and even moving speeches (the Get-
tysburg Address, Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream”). Few, however, would have predicted 
the degree to which language would come to dominate politics in the twentieth century, where 
the first systematic political uses to which it was put were largely anathema to the Left (think 
Goebbels). The fact of its arrival as a major player on the political stage can no longer be ignored 
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— from Roosevelt’s Fireside chats to spin doctors, from Hitler’s Table Talk to Nixon’s love-affair 
with New Criticism, and the inexplicable Teflonicity of the Great Communicator. Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality thus might be considered a first staging of the coming of age of a politi-
cal debate that reflects on the extent to which language now plays so capital a role in the art and 
performance of politics. What may turn out to be most instructive in this book is what it reveals 
about the discontents of the Left pluralism it honors and also about the limitations of language 
as a mode of radical democratic politics. 
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1. Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek, Contingen-
cy, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on 
the Left (London: Verso, 2000), 193. Subsuquent references 
will appear parenthetically within the text.
2. Paul Bové has been credited with pronouncing Old Left and 
Liberal thinkers like Rorty, Taylor, Politt, Ehrenreich, and 
those who write for The Nation “Left Conservatives” because 
they do not take poststructuralism’s critique of transparent 
communication and unmediated reality into account.
3. I present this in some detail in “Stendhal and the Politics of 
the Imaginary,” in Approaches to Teaching Stendhal’s The 
Red and the Black, eds. Stirling Haig and Dean de la Motte 
(New York: PMLA, 1999).
4. I obviously don’t agree with this accusation, which Martha 
Nussbaum makes in “The Professor of Parody,” The New 
Republic 22 (February 1999). 
5. And Žižek counters with “false disidentification” (103).
6. For me “it” retains overtones of the Freudian Id and the 
1950s horror movie. Still, some doctors are now defer-
ring assigning a sex to infants with somewhat ambiguous 
genitalia. Doubtless Butler’s enunciation of the reach of 
power into gender (from her Bodies That Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of “Sex”  [New York: Routledge, 1993], 7) 
has influenced the re-thinking of gender labeling.
7. Butler’s “How difficult it is even on the conceptual level 
to keep the transcendental and the social apart” (146), is 
followed by, “I would warn against understanding fantasy 
as something which occurs ‘on one level’ and social inter-
pellations as something that takes place on ‘another level’” 
(151). 
8. Although some readers of Butler liken this process to psy-
choanalysis, (which also undoes a signifier’s inordinate 
prestige), the two differ quite fundamentally: Butler’s signi-
fier is a public labeling, a symbolic naming; psychoanalysis 
works not with the commonly held symbols, but with the 
way a singular signifier acquires special, traumatic, and 
unknowable weight for a subject who suffers its proliferating 
effects. 
9. Make no mistake; the drives postdate the advent of the 
signifier.
10. In “Dynamic Conclusions” Butler equates Žižek’s real with 
the “truth” that Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe/Nancy cri-
tiqued in Lacan — a  “truth” that misrecognizes the crucial 
medium of its own transmission: “Indeed, this is nowhere 
more emphatically demonstrated than in Žižek’s own work. 
Consider the use of assertion, of formulas, of anecdote, of 
dialectical demonstration…there is no way to dissociate 
truth from the rhetoricity that makes it possible…” (278). 
Žižek defines the unmediatable real as a power to disturb 
the fiction that social differences are merely symbolic, that is, 
that they are not laminated with the radically non-symbolic 
(the real). This is a crucial point of disagreement, marked 
by Butler’s unaccustomed recourse to the ad hominem. 
She absolutely rejects the real as what drives language, 
the domain of power and control; for then the real would 
be precisely the obstacle to the limitless power of language 
that is the heart of Butler’s theory. So when she says, “This 
metaleptic function of [Žižek’s] discourse works most effi-
ciently when it remains undisclosed” (278), her heightened 
concern is reflected in her attribution to Žižek of a calculat-
ing disingenuousness about the ruses of his own speech.
11. She calls Laclau’s universalizing the particular the “making 
of an empire of its local meaning” and echoes Linda Zerilli 
and Joan Scott’s belief that there is “no possibility of extract-
ing the universal claim from the particular” (33).  
12. Karl Marx, “Critical Remarks on the Article: ‘The King 
of Prussia and Social Reform,’” in Karl Marx: Selected 
 Writings, trans. and ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 126.
13. Ibid., italics added. 
14. After Rousseau and Hegel, the fundamental principle of civil 
society is that the collective is responsible for (in all senses 
of the term) the human. (What Freud and Lacan add is that 
the non-human edge that seems to lie beyond the pale of 
humanity also inhabits it from within.)
15. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Human Emotions 
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1957). “The cult of man-
kind ends in the self-enclosed humanism of Comte, and 
let it be said, of fascism. This kind of humanism we can do 
without” (50). 
16. Ibid., 38-39.
17. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(New York: Doubleday, 1964), spoke there of “signs given” 
(one’s controlled and contrived performance) and “signs 
given off” (inadvertent slips).
18. Butler has been praised precisely for her volatility: see 
Michael Levinson, “Speaking to Power,” Lingua Franca 
(September 1998): 60-68. Levinson notes the “terrible 
claustrophobia” of Butler’s early work, “constructed ‘brick 
by brick’ from the theorists whose work she cobbles to-
gether…. Butler extracts theory from theory” (63). But he 
gives her high marks for subsequent books in which she 
lays bare the processes by which she changed her mind and 
began rethinking her stances.
19. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “La Nouvelle Héloïse,” in Oeuvres 
Complètes, eds. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1959), vol. II, xiv, II:235. 
20. It constitutes something like the total savoir that Hegel 
adumbrated (and which Lacan happened to critique strongly 
in “Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire,” in 
Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan [New York: Norton, 
1977].)
21. Reagan considered the fall of the wall his most important 
symbolic accomplishment. A chunk of its concrete is housed 
in his Presidential Library.
22. Laclau notices this pattern of argumentation in Butler. 
He finds Butler’s resistance to his argumentation on the 
 concrete abstract (the universal) to be “a result of her argu-
ment being so rooted in the Hegelian way of conceiving the 
articulation between the abstract and the concrete, which is 
one not of contamination but of reconciliation” (191). But 
he limits the scope of his characterization to just this one 
theoretical point.    
23. At one point, Butler equates universality with consensus 
based on local norms that must then be “culturally trans-
lated” to become universal (35). This pulls the rug out from 
under Laclau, who regards the totality as crushing the 
particular, with the third dimension, the universal — being 
the particular’s only recourse.  
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